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A Digital Signature Scheme based on two hard
problems
Dimitrios Poulakis and Robert Rolland
Abstract In this paper we propose a signature scheme based on two intractable prob-
lems, namely the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem
for elliptic curves. It is suitable for applications requiring long-term security and
provides smaller signatures than the existing schemes based on the integer factor-
ization and integer discrete logarithm problems.
1 Introduction
Many applications of the Information Technology, such as encryption of sensitive
medical data or digital signatures for contracts, need long term cryptographic secu-
rity. Unfortunately, today’s cryptography provides strong tools only for short term
security [5]. Especially, digital signatures do not guarantee the desired long-term
security. In order to achieve this goal Maseberg [21] suggested the use of more than
one sufficiently independent signature schemes. Thus, if one of them is broken, then
it can be replaced by a new secure one. Afterward the document has to be re-signed.
Again we have more than one valid signatures of our document. Of course, a draw-
back of the method is that the document has to be re-signed.
In order to avoid this problem, it may be interesting for applications with long-
term, to base the security of cryptographic primitives on two difficult problems, so if
any of these problems is broken, the other will still be valid and hence the signature
will be protected. We propose in this paper an efficient signature scheme built taking
into account this constraint. The following signature scheme is based on the integer
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factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem on a supersingular elliptic
curve. Remark that these two problems have similar resistance to attack, thus they
can coexist within the same protocol. The use of a supersingular curve allows us to
easily build a pairing that we use to verify the signature.
Several signature schemes combining the intractability of the integer factoriza-
tion problem and integer discrete logarithm problem were proposed but they have
proved either to be enough to solve the one of two problems for breaking the sys-
tem or to have other security problems [6, 9, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 30]. An interesting
scheme based on the above problems is GPS [8]. Furthermore, some recent such
schemes are given in [14, 15, 20, 26, 29, 30].
In section 2 we describe the infrastructure for the implementation of the scheme.
Then we present the key generation, the generation of a signature and the verifica-
tion. In section 3 we show how to build a elliptic curve adapted to the situation and
how to define a valuable pairing on it. In section 4 we address the problem of the
map to point function and give a practical solution. We deal with the performance of
our scheme and compare it with others in section 5. In section 6 we give a complete
example that shows that the establishment of such a system can be made in practice.
In section 7 we study the security of the scheme. Finally section 8 concludes the
paper.
2 The Proposed Signature Scheme
In this section we present our signature scheme.
2.1 Public and private key generation
A user A , who wants to create a public and a private key selects:
1. primes p1 and p2 such that the factorization of n = p1 p2 is unfeasible;
2. an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fq, a point P ∈ E(Fq) with ord(P) = n and
an efficiently computable pairing en such that en(P,P) is a primitive n-th root of
1;
3. g ∈ {1, . . . ,n− 1} with gcd(g,n) = 1 , a ∈ {1, . . . ,φ(n)− 1} and computes Q =
gaP;
4. two one-way, collision-free hash functions, h : {0,1}∗ → {0, . . . ,n− 1} and H :
{0,1}∗→< P >, where < P > is the subgroup of E(Fq) generated by P.
A publishes the elliptic curve E , the pairing en and the hash functions h and H. The
public key of A is (P,Q,g,n) and his private key (a, p1, p2).
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2.2 Signature generation
The user A wants to sign a message m ∈ {0,1}∗. Then he chooses at random k, l ∈
{1, . . . ,φ(n)− 1} such that k+ l = a. Next, he computes
s = k+ h(m)+ n mod φ(n) and S = glH(m).
Let x(S) be the x-coordinate of S and b a bit determining S. The signature of m is
(s,x(S),b).
2.3 Verification
Suppose that (s,x,b) is the signature of m. The receiver uses b in order to determine
y such that S = (x,y) is a point of E(Fq). He accepts the signature if and only if
en(gsP,S) = en(gh(m)+nQ,H(m)).
Proof of correctness of verification. Suppose that the signature (x,s,b) is valid and
S = (x,y) is a point of E(Fq). Then we get
en(gsP,S) = en(gk+h(m)+nP,glH(m)) = en(gh(m)+nQ,H(m)).
Suppose now we have a couple (s,S), where s ∈ {1, . . . ,φ(n)} and S ∈< P >,
such that
en(gsP,S) = en(gh(m)+nQ,H(m)).
Since H(m),S ∈< P >, there are u,v ∈ {0, . . . ,n−1} such that S = uP and H(m) =
vP. Thus we get
en((gsu− gh(m)+n+av)P,P) = 1.
The element en(P,P) is a primitive n-th root of 1 and so, we obtain
uv−1 ≡ ga+h(m)+n−s (mod n),
Putting l = a+ h(m)+ n− s mod φ(n) and k = a− l mod φ(n), we get
s = k+ h(m)+ n mod φ(n) and S = glH(m).
It follows that (s,x(S),b) is the signature of m (where b is a bit determining S).
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3 The elliptic curve and the pairing
In this section we show how we can construct an elliptic with the desired properties
in order to implement our signature scheme. This task is achieved by the following
algorithm:
1. select two large prime numbers p1 and p2 such that the factorization of p1 −
1, p2 − 1 are known and the computation of the factorization of n = p1 p2 is
unfeasible;
2. select a random prime number p and compute m = ordn(p);
3. find, using the algorithm of [4], a supersingular elliptic curve E over Fp2m with
trace t = 2pm;
4. return Fp2m and E .
Since the trace of E is t = 2pm, we get |E(Fp2m)|= (pm−1)2. On the other hand,
we have m= ordn(p), whence n|pm−1, and so n is a divisor of |E(Fp2m)|. Therefore
E(Fp2m) contains a subgroup of order n.
By [4, Theorem 1.1], we obtain, under the assumption that the Generalized Riem-
man Hypothesis is true, that the time complexity of Step 3 is ˜O((log p2m)3). Further-
more, since the factorization of φ(n) = (p1− 1)(p2− 1) is known, the time needed
for the computation of m is O((logn)2/ loglogn) [16, Section 4.4].
For the implementation of our signature scheme we also need a point P with order
n and an efficiently computable pairing en such that en(P,P) is a primitive n-th root
of 1. The Weil pairing does not fulfill this requirement and also, in many instances,
the Tate pairing; the same happens for the eta pairing (the ate and omega pairings
can be computed only on the ordinary elliptic curves) [1, 11, 28]. Let εn be one of
the previous pairings on E[n]. Following the method introduced by E. Verheul [25],
we use a distortion map φ such that the points P and φ(P) is a generating set for E[n]
and we consider the pairing en(P,Q) = εn(P,φ(Q)). The algorithm of [7, Section 6]
provides us a method for the determination of P and φ .
Another method for the construction of the elliptic curve E which is quite effi-
cient in practice is given by the following algorithm:
1. draw at random a prime number p1 of a given size l (for example l is 1024 bits);
2. draw at random a number p2 of size l;
3. repeat p2 = NextPrime(p2) until 4p1 p2− 1 is prime;
4. return p = 4p1 p2− 1.
It is not proved that this algorithm will stop with a large probability. This is an
open problem which is for p1 = 2 the Sophie Germain number problem. But in
practice we obtain a result p which is a prime of length 2l.
Since p ≡ 3 (mod 4), the elliptic curve defined over Fp by the equation
y2 = x3 + ax,
where −a is not a square in Fp, is supersingular with p+ 1 = 4p1 p2 points. By
[27, Theorem 2.1], the group E(Fp) is either cyclic or E(Fp)≃Z/2p1 p2Z×Z/2Z.
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In each case the group E(Fp) has only one subgroup of order n = p1 p2, and this
subgroup is cyclic.
If εn is one of the Weil, Tate or eta pairings on E[n], then we use the distor-
tion map φ(Q) = φ(x,y) = (−x, iy) with i2 = −1 (cf. [12]) and so, we obtain the
following pairing: en(P,Q) = εn(P,φ(Q)).
4 The map to point function
Let G be the subgroup of order n= p1 p2 of E(Fq) introduced in the previous section.
In order to sign using the discrete logarithm problem on this group, we have to define
a hash function into the group G, namely a map to point function. This problem was
studied by various authors giving their own method, for example in [3] or [13]. We
give here the following solution. Let us denote by |n| = ⌊log2(n)⌋+ 1 the size of
n. Let h be a key derivation function, possibly built using a standard hash function.
We recall that h maps a message M and a bitlength l to a bit string h(M, l) of length
l. Moreover we will suppose that h acts as a good pseudo-random generator. Let Q
be a generator of the group G. Let us denote by (Ti)i≥0 the sequence of bit strings
defined by T0 = 0 and for i ≥ 1
Ti = au · · ·a0,
where i = ∑uj=0 a j2 j and au = 1.
To map the message m to a point H(m) we run the following algorithm:
i := 0;
Repeat
k := h(m||Ti, |n|);
i := i+ 1;
Until k < n;
Output H(M) = k.Q;
This Las Vegas algorithm has a probability zero to never stop. In practice this
algorithm stops quickly, namely as 2|n|−1 < n < 2|n| then the expected value of the
number of iterations is < 2. If one can find a collision for H it is easy to find a
collision for h.
5 Performance Analysis
In this section we analyze the performance of our scheme. The computation of s
requires two additions modulo φ(n). The computation of S needs a modular expo-
nentiation gl (mod n) and the computations of H(m) and glH(m). Note that the
computation of gl mod n and k+ n mod φ(n) can be done off-line. Thus, the signa-
ture generation requires only a modular addition and a point multiplication on the
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elliptic curve. The signature verification needs two modular exponentiations, two
points multiplications on the elliptic curves, and two pairing computations. More-
over note that the length of the signature of a message is the double of its length.
The signature generation in the GPS scheme [8] needs only one modular expo-
nentiation and the signature verification two. The signature length is the triple of the
message length. The most efficient of the schemes given in [14, 15, 20, 26, 29, 30]
requires 3 modular exponentiations for the signature generation and 4 modular expo-
nentiations for the signature verification. The signature length of the above schemes
is larger than the double of the message length.
Hence we see that the signature length in our scheme is smaller than that in GPS
and the other schemes. Moreover, the performance of the proposed algorithm is
competitive to the performance of the above schemes.
6 Example
In this section we give an example of our signature scheme. We consider the 1024-
bits primes
p1 := 61087960575038789816988536114150792266377636351843177587564
31924627119957041754060999158399749767833896533906296859311
25485163415231551275212583044052150577614828617005803730389
43877400689242960278845109703690843026188873847913442234432
36591255684234493362159572100747699404245339214008078743836
7162669180839
and
p2 := 950794575789036193985289494100238271764913649341936446441081
377072500578035754538268902518142982960234055319718348171564
531835348013169675598575434394528269729126327128190711758193
487088395696503090307111303433870155114599617217105648040005
344506796898422897977489196110610260665664553656001074068087
13249343.
We take n = p1 p2. The number q = 4n− 1 is a prime. Since q ≡ 3 (mod 4), the
elliptic curve E defined by the equation y2 = x3 + x over Fq is superesingular. The
point P = (x(P),y(P)), where x(P) = 21500 + 2 and
y(P) = 92629334720096485394250229023531473128561210303747369871170
532503591346084781038053790347765721405539373837575715741111302632
222520728502603977901582753916707479492439228918725855423715991340
003621514555505206507732534242013847767107764800751435936328543137
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789247911179152023276247696951339536945505339588067200491193957998
044975563046555194785086909103272771864842171753848435480722850484
547366650914307823107502201128733622163636510656608071825566283432
994640380462713709910638633429178083083878848700277309884412794341
026781057881112432733889255328105052291841518470922081921433382412
472012678120546125640726148962.
has order n. We take g = 2,
a = 2256 + 29 + 1 = 11579208923731619542357098500868790785326998466
5640564039457584007913129640449
and we compute
ga mod n = 291246612437704212466554616370488460582482345
412043139387071627568366461190658309237330580043030838224854789252
968050905018578440545530480131761225347896913705349073419345335895
868832920014327349522957752032149784650672578527400186028060209053
035728070430079944852013985987562947197675511448867860271390438151
997510376157277527652722786834963496843487625119512000324307142997
876216044005309541179123902262183075125684914484636806915549910481
194533920018176890664864601123368083711476432553316859751469426810
204461407620204756483516542976417259702626996120442929825569733396
7126221051950952443115939209262561714767443.
Next, we compute Q = gaP = (x(Q),y(Q)), where
x(Q) = 492906626963089094011867684016548035835802792163377707597056
795455537761970341320418289803336076175870732053896841006011789243
411173491601076264818884432777686675649566399360544060115589059409
495626348669253033853643920668587107209662122339196308521380419432
395876777001037759129809826188826444792896302483531297500328577661
115644137663377694781584798800831919655207788055426633821916253648
545542264181819923868715936604077661019515870909292645145292612582
082056454491673626406957411250447615805464800603537427266421084067
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068889942487927367826706242600925470755091415792336658258887358233
6648011173165127581579893233
and
y(Q) = 925164000667984941436213463843562867132842692526639503713623
100761058759325653912386860742637828197211675023371765292190166225
688907658763278636042952123928199605188431021730950523522172176061
249916336352942245517540928470987327163690899169971423566730046146
040131461711982514952573761305725771859092373093590718229549775728
318091393459721685022050067573052541368464407556329663187692087325
785318806656273634451502898900933909082715458588013832847281982918
045250406217417892195982283414569723280463029281881025844011710313
003637423244716948430928877376648184124169704330493421073010959904
2000468957343998962535886947.
Therefore (P,Q,2,n) and (a, p1, p2) are a public key and the corresponding private
key for our signature scheme. Moreover, we can use the Tate pairing with the dis-
tortion map φ(x,y) = (−x, iy) with i2 =−1.
7 Security of the Scheme
In this section we shall discuss the security of our system. First, we remark that if
an attacker wants to compute the private key (a, p1, p2) from the public key, he has
to factorize n and to compute the discrete logarithm ga of Q to the base P and next
to calculate the discrete logarithm a of ga to the base g in the group Zn. Note that
an algorithm which computes the discrete logarithm modulo n implies an algorithm
which breaks the Composite Diffie-Hellman key distribution scheme for n and any
algorithm which break his scheme for a non negligible proportion of the possible
inputs can be used to factorize n [22, 2].
In order to study the security of the scheme we are going to look at the two worst
cases:
1. the factorization problem is broken but the elliptic curve discrete logarithm prob-
lem is not;
2. the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is broken but the factorization prob-
lem is not.
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In each case we will prove that if an attacker is able to generate a valid signature
for any given message m, then it is able to solve, in the first case the elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem and in the second case the factorization problem.
1) Let us suppose that the attacker is able to factorize n. Then he can compute
φ(n). But he is unable to compute a since a is protected by the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem and by the discrete logarithm problem modulo n, because the
only known relation involving a is Q = gaP. So, in order to produce a valid signature
of a message m the attacker has only two possibilities: he can arbitrary choose k, and
then he can compute s but not S, or choose arbitrary l and the he can compute S but
not s.
2) Let us suppose now that the attacker is able to solve the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem. Then he can compute ga but as the factorization problem is not
broken the discrete logarithm problem modulo n is not broken and consequently
he cannot compute a (cf. the beginning of this section). Then as in 1) he cannot
compute simultaneously s and S.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we defined a signature system based on two difficult arithmetic prob-
lems. In the framework chosen, these problems have similar resistance to known
attacks. We explained how to implement in practice all the basic functions we need
for the establishment and operation of this system. This strategy has an interest in
any application that includes a signature to be valid for long. Indeed, it is hoped that
if any of the underlying problems is broken, the other will still be valid. In this case,
the signature should be regenerated with a new system, without the chain of valid
signatures being broken. Finally, the signature length of our scheme is smaller than
that of the schemes based on integer factorization and integer discrete logarithm
problems, and its performance is competitive to that of these schemes.
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